Researchers increasingly have used the two primary venture capital databases -VentureOne and Venture Economics -to study venture capital (VC) financings. These data are largely self-reported. In this paper, we compare the actual contracts in 143 VC financings to their characterizations in the databases. The databases exclude roughly 15% of the financing rounds. The Venture Economics database oversamples larger rounds and California companies while the financing rounds included in the VentureOne database exhibit no significant bias. The databases provide unbiased, but noisy measures of financing amounts and their valuations. The databases also are less successful in measuring milestone rounds. The VentureOne database oversamples valuations for highly valued firms even controlling for firm characteristics. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners.
I. Introduction
An increasing number of researchers use the two primary venture capital databasesVentureSource (from VentureOne) and VentureXpert (from Venture Economics) -to study venture capital (VC) financings. 1 Practitioners use these databases to understand market conditions. Summary investment and valuation statistics from these databases also are widely cited in the popular press and by policymakers. These data are largely self-reported by the venture capitalists and / or by the companies in which they invest. In this paper, we compare the actual contracts in 143 VC financings to their characterizations in the two databases on four primary dimensions: whether the financings appear in the database, the financing amounts, whether the valuations of the financing appear in the database, and the valuations themselves.
We find that the databases exclude roughly 15% of the financing rounds and 20% of the financing committed. Aggregate statistics based on these databases, therefore, understate the amount of VC financing committed. At the same time, VentureOne tends to overstate the amount of financing actually disbursed. Both databases oversample California firms and larger rounds; the Venture Economics database, significantly so. This suggests that the widely reported preponderance of venture capital investment in California is somewhat overstated.
We find that the databases provide relatively unbiased measures of the amount of financing, alt hough the measures are noisy. The average absolute error is on the order of 10%.
The databases are less successful in dealing with milestone or staged financing rounds.
The databases are missing valuations for a substantial fraction of the financing rounds they report-almost 70% for Venture Economics and almost 30% for VentureOne. Financing rounds with valuations are more likely to be larger rounds, in California, and to have subsequently gone public. The valuations that the databases provide are relatively unbiased, but again, are fairly noisy with non-trivial average absolute errors. The sampling and milestone biases can materially affect researchers' estimates of returns and valuation patterns over time.
Finally, the VentureOne financing rounds that report post-money values have significantly higher valuations than the non-reporting firms.
Overall, we find that the VentureOne data are generally more reliable, more complete, and less biased than the Venture Economics data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our sample. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 discusses the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners.
Sample

Actual Contracts
We use a subset of the sample used by Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) . Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) study 213 VC investments in 119 portfolio companies by fourteen VC partnerships they obtained by asking each VC to provide detailed information on as many of their portfolio company investments as they were willing to provide. For each of these companies, the VCs provided the documents that include all the financing terms, the firm's equity ownership -investors, founders, management, etc. -and any contingencies to future financing. The VCs also provided (if available) the portfolio company's business plan at the time of the financing, the VC's internal analysis of the investment, and the subsequent portfolio company financial performance.
We eliminate those financing rounds for which we do not have the complete closing documents or complete information on the financing amounts and financing terms at closing.
We do this because we want to be absolutely sure that we have the correct data to compare to the databases. This leaves us with a sample of 143 VC investme nts in 98 portfolio companies by thirteen VC partnerships.
The first column of table I describes various aspects of the actual sample. Twenty-three of the 143 rounds are milestone rounds. In these rounds, the venture capitalists commit to a certain amount of funding. Some of the funding is provided at the closing of the round while additional funding is contingent on the company attaining milestones described in the contract.
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Milestone rounds, therefore, are problematic because the amount invested at closing and the total amount actually invested at those terms can differ.
An additional 19 rounds are those in which we were able to determine that the companies raised additional funding at the same terms (unrelated to milestones) more than thirty days after the initial closing. These closings are typically to sell shares that were authorized but unsold at the initial closing, often to new investors.
The table also shows that the 143 rounds represent $1,142 million in financing commitments by the VC firms. Of this, only $859 million was actually disbursed when the rounds closed.
The remainder of the column presents the time distribution, geographic distribution, and industry distribution of the sample. The bulk of the sample financings occur between 1996 and 1998. The geographical distribution of the portfolio companies in our sample is fairly uniform across California (28%), the Midwest (20%), the Northeast (24%), and elsewhere. In addition to studying financing amounts, we also are interested in studying valuations and their effect on return calculations. VCs typically measure valuations using the terms postand pre-money values. The post-money value equals the post-financing equity market capitalization of the company calculated at the share price of the financing round and assuming that all ownership stakes -convertible preferred stock and other classes of stock -are converted into common stock. This measure almost certainly overstates the true value of the company because it values the outstanding common stock at the same value as the classes of stock issued to the VCs despite the fact that the VCs receive superior control rights and liquidation rights.
The pre-money value equals the equity market value owned by investors before the financing round, calculated at the price per share of the financing round.
The second column of table I reports that we can calculate pre-and post-money values with a high degree of certainty for 119 of the 143 financing rounds. In addition to knowing the terms of the financing, we also must know the complete pre-financing ownership structure of the company. In most of the cases for which we cannot calculate post-money values, we are not completely sure of the details of the outstanding options.
Venture Economics and VentureOne data
For each of the 143 financing rounds, we searched the Venture Economics and VentureOne databases for the matching financing rounds. We consider the financing round a match if the round includes the VC firm in our sample, has a financing amount and occurs within four months of the date of our financing. Venture Economics claims to collect its data on VC investments primarily from VCs. In fact, it is the official database partner of the National Venture Capital Association. VentureOne claims to collect its data primarily from the companies themselves although it also surveys VCs.
Columns 3 and 4 of The databases are closer to the amount of capital actually disbursed at the initial closing ($859 million) with VentureOne above the actual amount and Venture Economics below.
VentureOnes overestimates are greater in the post-1993 period ($854 million versus $773 million 4 In our data, one company completed a financing round that raised most of the round at closing and some additional money two months later for a total of $A million. Venture Economics reports a round in excess of 30 times $A million in the closing month and a round of $A million two months later. The post-money value for the closing month is $A million. We eliminated the round of 30 times $A million in the closing month as clearly in error.
actually disbursed). The reason for the improvement is that the databases sometimes report the total amount committed in the round rather than the amount disbursed. This offsets the omission of other financing rounds. As we discuss later the, the databases sometimes report subsequent milestone achievements as additional financing rounds. This increases the overestimate of actual disbursements for VentureOne. Overall, then, the databases capture roughly 85% of the financings and commitments, but capture a larger fraction of the capital actually disbursed.
Results
Determinants of the inclusion of financing rounds
In this section, we consider the determinants of inclusion (or exclusion) of financing rounds in order to understand what biases if any are in the selection of VC investments in the different databases. Such biases potentially can affect conclusions concerning the total amount of VC investment, the distribution of that investment, and inferences concerning the returns of such investment.
We estimate a logit regression model for each database. The dependent variable equals 1 if the database reports a financing amount for the round and 0 if it does not. The regressions include the following independent variables. We use calendar year dummies (1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 or 1999 5 Economics, on the other hand, is biased towards larger, California rounds. Neither database is biased towards including companies that subsequently go public suggesting that such a performance bias is not in the databases.
Financing Round Amounts
Table III presents comparisons of actual financing round amounts to those reported by Venture Economics and VentureOne. For each round in which the amount of financing is not dependent on the achievement of any milestones (non-milestone rounds), we compute the ratios of the amounts reported by Venture Economics and VentureOne to the actual amount. For milestone rounds in which the investors invest in the company at the initial closing and commit additional funds contingent on the future achievement of milestones, we compute the ratios of the amounts reported by Venture Economics and VentureOne to the total committed amount assuming the achievement of all milestones, to the initial amount disbursed at closing, and to the actual amount raised based on the actual milestones achieved. Both databases are off by 25% of the actual round amount in more 10% of the rounds.
The results in panel A of table III also suggest that both databases treat milestone rounds inconsistently. For 20 milestone rounds, Venture Economics reports financing that is a median of 45% of the total financing committed to the round. The reported financing equals the amount initially disbursed in the median case. The average absolute error for both measures, however, exceeds 46%. Furthermore, the Venture Economics amount is off by at least 25% more than 47% of the time using both measures. Venture Economics, therefore, has a tendency to report the amount initially disbursed, but does not do this uniformly.
For 19 milestone rounds, VentureOne reports financing that is a median of 100% of the total financing committed to the round, but 163% of the financing initially disbursed. The average absolute error is 23% for total committed financing and over 200% for financing initially disbursed. The VentureOne amount is off by at least 25% more than 36% of the time using both measures. The VentureOne results are similar for amounts actually disbursed based upon the completion of milestones when we can calculate this). VentureOne, therefore, appears to have a tendency to report the total amount committed or the total amount ultimately disbursed, but also does not do this uniformly.
Because there are about six times as many non-milestones rounds as milestone rounds in our sample, the medians and average absolute errors for all rounds taken together are much closer to those for non-milestone rounds than those for milestone rounds. In the median company, the financing amount is correct for both databases. This implies that both databases understate and overstate financing round amounts with the same frequency leading to no overall bias in either direction in either database. For Venture Economics, the average absolute errors are roughly 20% both for total commitments and for initial disbursements with more than 22% of the rounds incorrect by at least 25%. For VentureOne, the average absolute errors are 11% for total commitments and 43% for initial disbursements with more than 15% of the rounds incorrect by at least 25%. Table IV considers rounds with milestones and with subsequent closings in more detail.
We were able to determine with certainty that the milestones were achieved in 7 of 21 Venture
Economics milestone rounds and 8 of 20 VentureOne milestone rounds. Venture Economics and
VentureOne include the milestone amount in the original round, respectively, in 3 and 4 of the milestone rounds; they report the milestone amount as a new round in 4 and 3 of the milestone rounds; and VentureOne double counts one milestone round.
The second part of table IV shows that both databases usually include amounts raised at subsequent closings in the original round amount, rather than as a new round. However, both databases sometimes double-count subsequent closing amounts, both including them in the original round amount and reporting them as a new round, which overstates the total amount raised.
Taken together, tables III and IV have the following implications: The databases do a better job of characterizing non-milestone rounds relative to milestone rounds. While the financing amounts are measured with a fair amount of error, the amounts tend to be unbiased on average. The presence of milestone rounds and subsequent closings leads both databases to misstate when firms receive financing. On average, the databases imply that firms receive more financing than they actually do -commitments rather than actual amounts along with double counting -and that firms receive the financing earlier than they actually do -including milestone amounts and subsequent closing amounts at the time of closing. These two effects will exert a downward bias on internal rate of return calculations using these data. To the extent that milestone deals have become more common recently, the results also imply that the databases will become less accurate over time.
Determinants of the inclusion of post-money values
In this section, we consider the determinants of whether the databases include a postmoney value. This is important for those papers that attempt to calculate returns using the company valuations provided.
As reported in The results are presented in Table V . In both models, Venture Economics is significantly more likely to include a post-money value if the company subsequently goes public and if the company is based in California. The result for IPOs suggests that care should be taken in calculating returns using only those firms that provide valuations. Such calculations will oversample companies that subsequently go public and will overestimate returns because companies that go public tend to be more valuable and provide greater rates of return to VC investors than those that do not.
Using the average values of the independent variables provided in panel A of table V along with the regression coefficients in panel B, we can get a sense of how large this bias is.
The estimated unconditional probability (i.e., using the data for all rounds) that Venture
Economics reports a post-money value for the average round is 12.8% if the company does not subsequently go public and 37.3% if it does.
The oversampling of California firms will a induce bias in the data if the characteristics of California firm valuations differ from those of other firms. We consider this possibility below ( VentureOne is significantly more likely to include a post-money value for larger financing rounds, for California-based companies, and for companies in life sciences. While
VentureOne is more likely to include values for firms that go public in both models, the variable is not significant when all financing rounds are included.
Because the IPO bias is smaller, return calculations using VentureOne data will be more accurate than those using Venture Economics. On the other hand, the bias in VentureOne towards valuing larger financing rounds suggests that VentureOne may oversample higher valuation rounds.
Financing Round Values
Having considered the determinants of whether the database provides a valuation, we now evaluate the accuracy of the valuations in this section.
Pre-money values
For the 119 rounds in our sample for which we have the necessary data, we compute the actual round pre-money value. As noted earlier, this equals the product of the price paid per share of common equivalent in the financing round and the number of common equivalents outstanding prior to the round. The value of outstanding options and warrants are calculated as if they were exercised.
In five milestone rounds, the contract either specifies that (1) the price per share paid at the initial closing will be less than the price per share paid at any later closing if the milestones are achieved of milestones or (2) amounts paid at such later closings are not in exchange for more shares (thereby increasing the effective price per share). The "total" calculations assume that the milestones are achieved while the "initial" calculations assume the milestones are not achieved. 
Post-money Values
In panels B and C of table VI, we report descriptive statistics for the ratios of the postmoney values reported by Venture Economics and VentureOne to the actual post-money values.
We compute the actual post-money values several different ways: including and excluding amounts raised at closings held more than 30 days after the initial closing as part of the round amount, and, for milestone rounds, based on the total committed amount, the initial amount, and the actual amount raised (based on milestones actually attained). Panels B and C of Table VI also show that the Venture Economics' median post-money value errors are -6% to -7% while VentureOne's are 3% to 5%. Both databases' average postmoney value errors are statistically insignificant. Thus, while the average absolute error is large, it does not appear to be biased.
Relative valuations of firms with Venture Economics and VentureOne values
There is one additional bias that is potentially in the data. It is possible that the firms for whom Venture Economics and VentureOne report post-money values have valuations different from those for the firms without such valuations. In table VII, we consider this bias by estimating the relationship of the actual (log) pre-and post-money values of our sample firms with a dummy variable equal to one if the relevant database provides a post-money value. The regressions control for other company characteristics. By using a log specification, the coefficient on the post-money value dummy measures the percentage increase in valuation associated with financing rounds for which the database reports such valuations. 
Summary and Implications
In this paper, we compare the actual contracts in 143 VC financings to their characterizations in the Venture Economics and VentureOne databases. The results in this paper should help academics and practitioners use the databases and interpret the results more effectively.
The databases exclude roughly 15% of the financing rounds. The exclusions and the mixed treatment of milestone rounds lead the databases to understate the amount of financing commitments by 20%. At the same time, the mixed treatment of milestone rounds leads VentureOne to overstate the financing actually disbursed. These findings suggest some caution in interpreting the aggregate financing numbers provided by these databases.
The Venture Economics database oversamples larger rounds and California companies while the financing rounds included in the VentureOne database exhibit no significant bias. The databases provide unbiased, but noisy measures of financing amounts and their valuations.
These results suggest that studies like Gompers and Lerner (2000) that estimate regressions using the valuations as dependent variables are not biased.
In general, the databases are less successful in measuring milestone round amounts and valuations. In our sample, roughly 15% of the financing rounds are milestone rounds. We are unsure what the percentage is in the general population of deals. To the extent that the use of milestones is increasing in the current financing environment, the noisiness may increase over time.
There are two characteristics of the databases that will tend to exert a downward bias on those studies like Cochrane (2001) 
Table I Sample Summary
Summary statistics for actual financing rounds and rounds reported by Venture Economics (VE) and VentureOne (V1) for 143 financing rounds in 98 companies from 1986 to 1999. The 'actual rounds' column gives the number of actual rounds by year, by company location and by industry. The 'post-money actual' column gives the number of actual rounds for which our data was sufficient to compute post-money values (based on the total committed amount, and excluding amounts raised at subsequent closings). The other columns give the number of our rounds for which VE/V1 report amounts raised and post-money values. The total committed amount is the aggregate committed financing for our 143 rounds; the total disbursed amount is the aggregate amount disbursed at the initial closings. We also report a frequency distribution for the number of months the matching round in VE/V1 differs from the actual date of the initial closing. Milestone rounds are those in which the investors invest in the company at the initial closing and commit additional funds contingent on the future achievement of milestones. Rounds with subsequent closings are those in which additional closings (unrelated to the achievement of milestones) were held more than 30 days after the initial closing. 0  85  101  1  22  8  2  13  5  3  2  0  4 2 2
Table II Determinants of a financing round appearing in Venture Economics and VentureOne
Logit regressions for the determinants of a financing round appearing in Venture Economics (VE) and VentureOne (V1) for 143 financing rounds in 98 companies from 1986 to 1999. The dependent variable equals 1 if the actual financing round is reported in the relevant database and equals 0 if the round is not reported. The independent variables are the natural logarithm of the actual financing amount of the financing round in millions of dollars (based on the total committed amount, excluding amounts raised at closings more than 30 days after the initial closing), calendar year dummies (1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 or 1999) Significant at the 1% level, ***; 5% level, **; and 10% level, *.
Table III
Comparisons of financing round amounts to those reported by Venture Economics and VentureOne
Comparisons of financing round amounts to those reported by Venture Economics (VE) and VentureOne (V1) for 143 financing rounds in 98 companies from 1986 to 1999. For each round in which the amount of financing is not dependent on the achievement of any milestones (non-milestone rounds), we compute the ratios of the amounts reported by VE and V1 to the actual amount. For milestone rounds, in which the investors invest in the company at the initial closing and commit additional funds contingent on the future achievement of milestones, we compute the ratios of the amounts reported by VE and V1 to the initial amount, to the total committed amount assuming the achievement of all milestones, and to the actual amount raised based on the actual milestones achieved. We report descriptive statistics (median, average, standard deviation of the average, average absolute error, defined as the average absolute deviation from 1.0, and the number of observations) as well as frequency distributions for these ratios. In the columns labeled 'All', we report these descriptive statistics and frequency distributions for all rounds taken together (both milestone and non-milestone); for non-milestone rounds the initial, total, and actual ratios are by definition the same. For rounds with multiple closings, our convention is to include amounts raised at closings within 30 days of the initial closing as part of the round amount. In panel A, we include amounts raised at subsequent closings held more than 30 days after the initial closing (these usually occur within 60 days) as part of the round amount; in panel B we do not. Notwithstanding the above, the 'milestone initial' amounts do not include amounts raised at closings related to the achie vement of milestones. The data in Panel A exclude rounds for which our data is insufficient to determine whether subsequent closings occurred. In both panels, the 'milestone actual' and 'all actual' data exclude milestone rounds for which our data is insufficient to determine whether milestones were achieved. Table IV Treatment of milestone and subsequent closing amounts by Venture Economics and VentureOne
Treatment of milestone and subsequent closing amounts by Venture Economics (VE) and VentureOne (V1) for 143 financing rounds in 98 companies from 1986 to 1999. Milestone rounds are those in which investors invest in the company at the initial closing and commit additional funds contingent on the future achievement of milestones . We show the number of financing rounds in which amounts raised upon the achievement of milestones or at closings held more than 30 days after the initial closing are (i) included in the original round amount, (ii) reported as a new round, (iii) both (double-counted), or (iv) neither.
VE V1
Total number of milestone rounds 21 20
Milestone rounds in which milestones were not achieved or our data is insufficient to tell 14 12
Milestone rounds in which milestones were achieved 7 8
Milestone amount included in the original round amount 3 4
Milestone amount reported as a new round 4 3
Milestone Logit regressions of the determinants of whether Venture Economics (VE) and VentureOne (V1) report a post-money value for a financing round for 143 financing rounds in 98 companies from 1986 to 1999. For each database, the dependent variable is 1 if a post-money value is reported for the financing round, 0 if it is not. The independent variables are the natural logarithm of the amount of the financing round in millions (based on the total committed amount, excluding amounts raised at closings more than 30 days after the initial closing), calendar year dummies (1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 or 1999) , a geography indicator (equal to 1 if the company is based in California and 0 otherwise), an IT/telecom indicator (equal to 1 if the company is in the information technology or telecom industries and 0 otherwise), a life sciences indicator (equal to 1 if the company is in the biotechnology or health care industries and 0 otherwise), and an IPO indicator (equal to 1 if the company subsequently went public, 0 otherwise). The first set of regressions uses only the rounds the database has (i.e., reports a round amount for Comparisons of financing round pre-and post-money values to those reported by Venture Economics (VE) and VentureOne (V1) for 143 financing rounds in 98 companies from 1986 to 1999. For each round in which the amount of financing is not dependent on the achievement of any milestones (non-milestone rounds), we compute the ratios of the pre-and postmoney values reported by VE and V1 to the actual pre-and post-money values. We compute a pre-money value as the product of the price paid per share of common equivalent in the financing round times the number of common equivalents, including options and warrants, outstanding prior to the round. A post-money value is defined as the round pre-money value plus the amount raised in the round. For milestone rounds, in which the investors invest in the company at the initial closing and commit additional funds contingent on the future achievement of milestones, we compute the ratios of the pre-and post-money values reported by VE and V1 to the actual pre-and post-money values based on the initial amount, based on the total committed amount assuming the achievement of all milestones, and based on the actual amount raised according to the actual milestones achieved. We report descriptive statistics (median, average, standard deviation of the average, average absolute error, defined as the average absolute deviation from 1.0, and the number of observations) as well as frequency distributions for these ratios. In the columns labeled 'All', we report these descriptive statistics and frequency distributions for all rounds taken together (both milestone and non-milestone); for non-milestone rounds the initial, total, and actual ratios are by definition the same. Since VE and V1 only report post-money values, we impute the reported pre-money value for a round as the reported post-money value less the reported round amount. In panel A, we present our pre-money value data. Rounds for which the reported post-money value is greater than the reported round amount (resulting in negative pre-money values) are excluded. For rounds with multiple closings, our convention is to include amounts raised at closings within 30 days of the initial closing as part of the round amount. Since the total amount raised affects the post-money value, in panel B, we include amounts raised at subsequent closings held more than 30 days after the initial closing (these usually occur within 60 days) as part of the post-money value; in panel C we do not. Notwithstanding the above, the 'milestone initial' amounts do not include amounts raised at closings related to the achievement of milestones. The data in Panel B exclude rounds for which our data is insufficient to determine whether subsequent closings occurred. In all panels, the 'milestone actual' and 'all actual' data exclude milestone rounds for which our data are insufficient to determine whether milestones were achieved and for which this affects the calculations. Table VII OLS regressions to determine whether there exist valuation biases in Venture Economics and VentureOne
The dependent variables in these OLS regressions are the natural logarithms of the actual financing round pre-and postmoney values. Pre-money values are based on the price per share paid at the initial closing and post-money values based on the total committed amount, excluding amounts raised at subsequent closings. For each database, the independent variables are a dummy that is equal to 1.0 if the database reports a post-money value for the round and 0.0 otherwise, calendar year dummies (1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 or 1999) 
